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1 Introduction
Within this paper we attempt to explain the endogenous formation of cartels
in large economies. We assume that contracts generating cartels are legally
permissible and can be enforced. This situation can be observed; for instance
in Switzerland at some time anti trust legislative and executive measures
were not accepted and as a result, cartelization of certain industries was
observed. Also, if we consider a union representing a group of workers with
(approximately) equal characteristics to be a cartel in the technical sense,
then obviously at least parts of the society are legally cartelized in most
western countries.
However, it would seem that general equilibrium theory or related approaches
via coalition formation in exchange economies are unable to predict the en-
dogenous formation of cartels, even in clear cut situations which call joint
action within sectors of the market. The most simple versions of such a
situation is represented by a glove market or a glove game.
In such an economy groups of traders occupy corners of the market, that is
sectors of di￿erent (nonoverlapping) sets of initial assignments of indispensi-
ble goods. When contracts are feasible ￿ and can be legally enforced ￿ there
seems to be a strong incentive for agents to form (at least intermediately)
cartels by joining forces within these corners. These cartels may then act as
players or agents themselves, so that the responsibility is delegated to rep-
resentatives bargaining for a share of the market. This procedure points to
a di￿erent game in which few players act to the bene￿t of those they rep-
resent. If we consider the game in which the various cartels act as players,
then their bargaining power may increase and they may force (members of)
opposing cartels to accept a distribution of pro￿ts (allocations, imputations)
that is much more favorable to them. One reason for this achievement is
the increasing blocking power of a cartel: it is not only of relevance what
a coalition of traders can attain but also what they can prevent others to
achieve.
In this situation the result of cooperation within cartels might be much dif-
ferent from what is observed when agents show price taking behavior. This
points to the fact that equivalenve theorems for large markets are uncapable
of representing cartelization.
The same is true, to mention one concept from Game Theory, for the Shapley
value. As it measures the marginal contribution of traders on average and
as almost all coalitions in a large economy look rather similar to the grand? Section 1: Introduction ? 2
coalition, the Shapley value represents (eventually) the marginal contribution
of traders to the total market ￿ which is zero for agents living in an excess
supply corner.
In a paper ￿Formation of Cartels in Large Markets￿ S. Hart ([1]) discusses
this situation from the viewpoint of a di￿erent solution concept (the vNM￿
Stable Set). He argues that in markets with disjoint corners, the formation
of cartels has to be a result of the solution concept employed, it should be
an endogeneous concept. And he points to the vNM￿Stable Set which (for
the nonatomic case and other than the core etc.) does indicate the power of
cartels.
Hart’s argument essentially is that there are vNM￿Stable Sets which are
obtained from ￿nite vNM￿Stable Sets in a symmetric way (treating all players
of the same type alike). This, he goes on, shows that coalition of types have
been formed, acted as players (in the ￿nite game) and distributed the pro￿ts
obtained this way symmetrically among their members. As all the solutions
in the continuous case are of this shape (his main result) he goes even further
in holding that society has to organize itself this way.
Certainly one can argue that it is the way coalitions form which matters
and not so much in which way they agree to distribute their pro￿ts. But,
eventually this approach is not su￿ciently explanatory.
First of all, vNM￿Stable Sets are there in abundance ￿ so which of them
should be adopted and why? Some results about vNM￿Stable Sets point to
strange shapes of the solution concepts the economic meaning of which may
be questioned.
Secondly, we are dealing with a set valued concept. Other than some of
our favorites, it does not shrink down to a single valued solution for large
markets ￿ so the claim that society organizes itself this way fails to explain
the motivation resulting from a distribution of wealth to be expected from
the bargaining process. After all it is the distribution of wealth that matters
in the public discussion. Not just the formation of cartels as such.
These problems may constitute grounds for economists to be not completely
saytis￿ed with vNM￿Stable Sets.
Hart argues rightfully that approaches to use the core as the solution concept
in the case of a multi corner market (a glove game) fail to show some regard
for the cartel power of the long side. These approaches generally assume the
existence of cartels a priori. On the other hand, it may be di￿cult to argue
in favor of the vNM concept if an abundance of cartels is equally alike and? Section 1: Introduction ? 3
in each of them it is not clear what its members can expect.
The sitution has certainly improved since Harts paper. There are now more
results concerning vNM￿Stable Sets which support his view. In a recent
paper Rosenm￿ller and Shitovitz [4] are able to characterize all convex
vNM-Stable sets of a glove game with a continuum of traders representing
disjoint corners of the market. They show that all convex vNM￿Stable Sets
are of a ￿standard￿ shape indicating indeed the formation of cartels within
the di￿erent corners of the market. Cartels bargain by representatives. The
(symmetric) distribution of the result of the ￿few player game￿ among the
members of the cartels is organized in a most plausible fashion: on the short
side, each trader gets a share exactly proportional to his holdings and on the
long side, the share is not exceeding his holdings.
Nevertheless, the vNM concept still admits a variety of distributions of the
outcome.
We wish to point out another solution concept which also organizes society
in cartels (cartels of the various corners, that is). Other than our above
aquaintance, it is single valued and hence organizes not only the coalitions
but also provides the allocations.
Moreover, in the context we are dealing with (￿large but ￿nite games￿) the
concept really does what Hart claims should be done: it treats cartels as
players in some di￿erent (small, ￿nite) game and distributes accordingly
between cartels. Moreover, frequently it assigns an equal share to each cartel.
Finally, our concept organizes inside each cartel: it provides symmetric allo-
cations and respects the initial holdings of a single trader in a most sensitive
way.
This concept is the modi￿ed nucleolus or modiclus as we call it, due to
one of the authors (P. Sudh￿lter, [8]). Explicitely it derives its strength
from a fact not taken into consideration by most concepts concerning coali-
tional power: not only the power of coalitions (cartels) to achieve gains is
important but also their ￿preventive power￿. When organizing the society,
the arguments of the kind ￿there is no way without us￿ may be not so coop-
erative, but they may be more convincing.
After all, a union representing a large group of workers usually does not
argue that their members can achieve a great deal without the employees
by organizing production and trading within their rank and ￿les. On the
contrary: the union threatens to organize a strike, at which the opponents
will not be able to achieve anything.? Section 1: Introduction ? 4
This idea is generally not captured by the core. Players and groups argue
what they can achieve by cooperation within coalitions and eventually a set
of generally accepted solutions appears. Which one to choose may depend
on the situation. But in the cornered market, the glove game, it is just the
bargaining power of a corner that fails, they can achieve little by cooperating
on their own. A cartel representing a corner of the market develops coalitional
power just because it prevents the opposing forces of the economy to organize
themselves successfully. This argument eventually leads to global agreements
in which the cartels receive considerable shares. So after all, coalitional power
is not just re￿ected by the ability and the legal possibilities to organize a
coalition but much more by the power of preventing organization elsewhere.
The formal tool to assess what a coalition can withhold its opponents from is
the dual game. Formally, this is another coalitional function derived from
the original one. It assigns the complementary worth of the complementary
coalition. Thus, the dual game assigns little value to a coalition if the com-
plementary coalition is powerful, and vice versa. We will have to elaborate
this concept to some extent.
The framework we are dealing with is the coalitional function of Cooperative
TU￿Game Theory. This is indeed a serious assumption from the technical
point of view. Hart argues within an NTU framework of exchange economy,
the vNM￿concept he uses can be formulated in this context and vNM￿Stable
Sets may be regarded as su￿ciently ￿ordinal￿. The modiclus initially is a car-
dinal concept. There are attempts to de￿ne nucleoli type concepts ordinally
(e.g.Kalai [2]). The de￿nition of a modiclus based on the excess functions
constructed within this context eventually may be successfull.
Consider a coalitional game given by triple (I;P;v): Here I is the (￿nite) set
of agents or players, P the power set of I, called system of coalitions,
and
v : P ! R; v(;) = 0;
a real valued function on P, the coalitional function. The dual game is
given by
v
?(S) := v(I)   v(I   S) (S 2 P): (1)
This game re￿ects the preventive power of coalitions. We do not want, how-
ever, to solely rely on the dual game. Both, the achievment power and the
preventive power matter in the emergence of the ￿nal solution. Hence, we
contruct a device which incoporates v and v? simultaneously. This game? Section 1: Introduction ? 5
is the dual cover. To this end we take two copies of the set of players or
agents, say
I
1;2 = I  f0;1g;
and construct a game  v on the coalitions of this set (the power sets are



















Here we have identi￿ed both copies of the original player set I with I; e.g.,
we do not distinguish between I and
I
0 = I  f0g  I
1;2:
The game  v takes pairs of coalitions into account, in one of them players
act ￿constructively￿ and in the other one ￿preventively￿. The r￿les are then
reversed and one measures the maximal joint worth players could achieve by
combining their forces this way. This game re￿ects the joint e￿ects of the
game and its dual. Note that it is de￿ned for the ￿union￿ of both copies of the
player set. Therefore, if we turn now to the solution concept, we consider the
projection of the result from the cover game onto the original player version.
Then we obtain a concept that is de￿ned for the original set of players.
Let us shortly describe the modiclus. On one hand, it is a nucleolus type
concept (Schmeidler [5]). For the prenucleolus, one lists the excesses
e(S;x;v) = v(S)   x(S)
(reasons to complain ) for any preimputation x (i.e.,x 2 RI; x(I) = v(I)) in
a (weakly) decreasing order, say
(x) := (::: ;e(S;x;v);:::): (3)
Then the prenucleolus  is the unique imputation such that () is lexico-
graphically minimal, i.e.
() lexic (x) for all preimputations x: (4)
The modi￿ed nucleolus or modiclus   lists bi￿excesses
e(S;x;v)   e(T;x;v)? Section 1: Introduction ? 6
and proceeds accordingly. Note that di￿erences of excesses or bi￿excesses
can be seen as sums of excesses of the primal and dual game. Hence, the
dual cover will eventually provide the appropiate interpretation. Under the
regime of the modiclus, the pair of coalitions with respect to which agents
exchange the most heated debate is, by a suitable agreement over an impu-
tation, arranged as best as possible. Thereafter, the second pair in con￿ict
is taken care of, and so on (lexicographically).
One may think that, on ￿rst glance, this concept complicates the already
involved procedure the nucleolus is asking for. Technically, this is certainly
true (possibly a barrier against intensive treatment). From the point of view
of interpretative power however, the concept surpasses the nucleolus. As it
turns out, it takes care of the dual game (the ￿destructive power of coalitions￿)
in the most natural way - and allows for all interpretations the nucleolus is
capable of. For, as it turns out (see [8]), the modiclus   is the projection
of the prenucleolus of the dual cover game  v de￿ned on I1;2 on the original
player set I.
Hence, if one wants to represent the constructive and preventive power of
coalitions simultaneously, then one should turn to the modiclus. Indeed, the
modiclus shows a surprising power in dealing with situations in which the
preventive power is predominat ￿ that is, in markets with corners, which call
for the endogenous formation of cartels. This is what we demonstrate in the
following sections.
In this context, the modiclus not only generates cartels, it frequently gener-
ates the ￿natural￿ or most ￿ideal￿ distributions of payo￿. It respects types,
that is, traders of equal characteristics obtain the same share. Thus, inside
each corner, the argumentative strength of a trader in the coalition formation
process is respected and cartels are seen to emerge.
But in addition, the modiclus also respects the impact of cartelization re-
ferring to the ￿representative game￿ behind the scene. For if cartels are of
equal power, then they are treated equally. That is after cartelization, the
long side of the market has the same strength as the short side and the sym-
metries of the ￿representative game￿ are respected as well. This is why we
believe that the complex procedure of distributing according to the modiclus
justi￿es consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model
and discuss the behavior of excesses. We explain the decisive behavior of
the excess function on ￿diagonal colitions￿ ￿ which are in a well speci￿ed
sense e￿cient and e￿ective. In Section 3 we classify the behavior of the? Section 1: Introduction ? 7
modiclus within the framework of the ￿Ocean Game￿ which represents uni-
form distribution of initial assigment. For this game we achieve a complete
description of the modiclus. This section exhibits the formation of cartels.
The treatment of the various corners of the market is described for ￿glove
markets￿.? Section 2: The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal ? 8
2 The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal
A game, as explained in Section 1, is a tripel (I;P;v) satisfying v(;) = 0:
Frequently we use the term also for the coalitional function and not always
for the tripel. We are predominantly interested in market games or to-
tally balanced games which can be generated from exchange economies
(Shapley￿ Shubik [6]). In order to represent such a game we use the
representation as a minimum game. That is, v is the minimum of ￿nitely
many nonnegative additive set functions (distributions or measures), say

1;::: ;














According to Kalai￿Zemel [3], every totally balanced game can be rep-
resented this way. A traditional version is the glove game. In this game
coalitions need to combine indispensible factors (right hand and left hand
gloves) in order to acquire pro￿ts by selling the product (pairs of gloves) on
some external market.
We wish to concentrate on the orthogonal case, that is, there are separate
(disjoint) corners of the market represented by the carriers of 
, denoted by
C(
) = C ( = 1;::: ;r). Eventually (cf. Section 3) we shall assume that
each player owns a quantity of one and only one factor, hence I =
Sr
=1 C
describes a partition of I. Hence, the initial assignments introduced this
way are uniformly distributed . Consequently, each 
 is described by

(S) = jS \ j (S 2 P): In this case we call the ￿multi￿sided glove game￿
(I;P;v) an Ocean Game. (For r = 2 this amounts to a glove game.)
Orthogonality is certainly a restriction within the class of market games. It
implies that a coalition which completely lacks one factor receives no pro￿t.
Thus, each of the r di￿erent corners of the market is de￿ned by the possession
of a sole factor.
We use the abbreviation M in order to indicate the total mass of 
; that











j ( = 1;::: ;r) (2)
is satis￿ed. For convenience, the corners of the market are ordered according
to total initial assignment, i.e., M1    Mr holds true.? Section 2: The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal ? 9
Any coalition S 2 P decomposes naturally into the coalitions of its partners






 = S \ C
 ( = 1;::: ;r): (3)
An important system of coalitions is provided by the diagonal which is
formally given by
D := fS 2 P 
(S) = v(S) ( = 1;::: ;r)g: (4)
A coalition S 2 D is called a diagonal coalition because, geometrically,
the image of S under the vectorvalued measure (
1;::: ;
r) is located on
the diagonal of Rr. Economically, diagonal coalitions are e￿cient, as there
is no excess supply of factors available in order to generate a utility of v(S):
An imputation of v is a distribution of the total wealth of the grand coalition
that is also individually rational, i.e., an element of
I(v) := fx 2 R
I j x(I) = v(I); xi  vfig (i 2 I)g:
Similarly, the core of v is given by
C(v) := fx 2 R
n j x(I) = v(I); x(S)  v(S) (S 2 P)g:
Whenever we are dealing with uniformly distributed initial assignments (i.e.,
with Ocean Games), the core is the convex hull of the measures 
 with
minimal M = M1 ( = 1;::: ;r).
Note that, on diagonal sets, v behaves additively. As a consequence, it is
not hard to see that any core element x equals the game on the diagonal
system D (x(S) = v(S) (S 2 D)). In a sense, a diagonal coalition S is also
e￿ective: it can a￿ord (xi)i2S by its own productive possibilities.
Within the diagonal we are particulaly interested in maximal elements.
These are diagonal coalitions S such that each corner assembles the maximal
possible amount of goods and hence the coalitions worth is v(I). More
precisely, such coalitions satisfy

1(S) =  = 
r(S) = M
1; (5)
i.e., the same number of agents M1 joins from each corner. The system of
maximal coalitions is denoted by
D
m := fS 2 P S satis￿es (5)g; (6)? Section 2: The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal ? 10
note that this system is nonempty in view of the uniform distribution gener-
ally assumed.
The notion of excess is central to the discussion of nucleolus type solution
concepts. Given a preimputation x, recall that the excess of a coalition
S 2 P (cf. Section 1) is given by
e(S;x;v) = v(S)   x(S): (7)
This quantity measures the amount by which coalition S misses its worth
v(S), hence is dissatis￿ed with x. The maximal excess at x is
(x;v) := max

e(S;x;v) S 2 P
	
: (8)
The task of computing excess is a frequently imposed burden; we start out
with some versions concerning glove markets. Here is the ￿rst simple Lemma:
Lemma 2.1. Let v be a orthogonal game and let x be an imputation of v.
Let  S 2 D be a diagonal set and let S 2 P be such that  S  S holds true.
Assume that S =  S is true for at least one  2 f1;::: ;rg: Then it follows
that
e(S;x;v)  e( S;x;v) (9)
is true.
In other words, if all corners (apart from the smallest ones) get rid of ex-
cess agents (providing excess supply of commodities), then the reasons to
complain increase (i.e., the excess e(;x;v) increases with more e￿cient and
e￿ective coalitions). Or, geometrically, we could say that ￿moving towards
the diagonal￿ from above increases the excess. Diagonal coalitions have a ten-
dency to most e￿ectively phrase opposition against imputations proposed.
Proof: Let v be represented via (1). In view of assumptions, we have
v( S) = 
( S) = 
( S) = 
(S) = v(S)  
(S) ( = 1;::: ;r); (10)
thus
e(S;x;v) = v(S)   x(S) = v( S)   x(S)  v( S)   x( S) = e( S;x;v); (11)
q.e.d.
The next lemma shows that, with stronger conditions, we can ￿move towards
the diagonal￿ from below with still increasing excess. In other words, it is also? Section 2: The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal ? 11
true that coalitions can improve their e￿ectiveness/e￿ciency by recruiting
agents from outside. To see this, let v again be orthogonal and represented
as in (1). Note that any imputation b x can be represented in a standardized
version respecting the corners of the market. Precisely, this means that b x
can be written







such that c = (c)=1;:::;r is a vector of nonnegative coe￿cients summing up
to 1 (￿convexifying coe￿cients￿) and ()=1;:::;r are measures with carriers
C, having the same total mass (C) = M as 
. Now we have
Lemma 2.2. Let v be an orthogonal game represented via (1). Let b x be
an imputation and let 1;::: ;r be the corresponding representing measures
according to (12). Let S 2 P and  S 2 D be such that
v(S)  v( S) (13)
and

( S)   
(S)
M1 
( S)   (S)
M (14)
holds true for  = 1;::: ;r:
Then
e(S;x)  e( S;x) (15)
is true.
That is, moving towards the diagonal from below increases the excess. More-
over, the excess increases with increasing sets on the diagonal. Consequently,
if (14) is globally valid for pairs of coalitions satisfying (13), then the maximal
excess appears at coalitions of Dm, provided this system is nonempty.
Proof: Choose  such that
v(S) = 
(S)  
(S) ( = 1;::: ;r) (16)
holds true, then we obtain the following set of equations and inequalities:

( S)   
(S) = 
( S)   
(S) (as  S 2 D)
 
( S)   
(S) (by (16)) : (17)? Section 2: The Model, Excesses, and the Diagonal ? 12
Here, the left hand side term is nonnegative because it equals v( S)   v(S):
Using (14) we obtain therefore





( S)   
(S)
M1 
( S)   (S)
M (18)
for  = 1;::: ;r and hence, using the convexifying coe￿cients involved in b x
via (12) ,







( S)   (S)
M : (19)


















v( S)   b x( S)  v(S)   b x(S); (21)
q.e.d.
Remark 2.3. In the situation described by Lemma 2.2, the condition (13) is





M ( = 1;::: ;r): (22)
Thus, there is a bound on the relative deviation of an imputation from the initial
assignment inside which the excess increases towards the diagonal.? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 13
3 The Modiclus of the Ocean Game








as de￿ned in Section 2 and recall that each measure 
 on its carrier C can
be viewed as vector 
 = (1;::: ;1): Let us now introduce the long side and
the short side of the market. Again we assume that the corners are ordered
according to size. Now, let the ￿rst  groups, say, be of equal (minimal) size.
That is, we de￿ne the quantity  2 f1;::: ;rg by the reqirement
M
1 =  = M
 < M
+1    M
r: (2)
Then these ￿rst  corners have to be completely present in any coalition
achieving the total worth v(I), they represent the short side of the market.
With respect to this game, we are in the position to completely compute our
solution concept, i.e., the modi￿ed nucleolus or modiclus.
The de￿nition of this concept has been indicated in the introduction: the
modiclus of a game v, denoted by  (v), is the unique imputation, that lex-
icographically minimizes the (ordered) vector of bi￿excesses. (Indeed, note
that the modiclus must be individually rational by Corollary 2.6 of [8], be-
cause an orthogonal game is zero-monotonic: v(S [ fig)   v(S)  0 =
vfig (S 2 P; i 2 I)) Equivalently, it is the projection of the prenucleolus
of the dual cover game onto the set of primal agents. For the details see
Sudh￿lter [8].
As it turns out, the modiclus is quite sensitive with respect to the relative
size of the corners. If the long side of the market exceeds the short side just
moderately, then the long side has su￿ciently much bargaining power. By
the formation of cartels, each corner on the long side can achieve some gains.
The modiclus assigns the ideal point, that is, equal treatment prevails with
respect to the corners as well as inside each corner. Formally, the ideal point
is the assignment  x given by
 xi :=
M1
rM (i 2 C
;  = 1;::: ;r): (3)
If there are excessively many agents on the long side, then the modiclus
reacts as the core, the (limiting) Shapley value, and the Walrasian payo￿
distribution: agents with excess supply of commodity receive zero utility.? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 14











; if i 2 C
 ( = 1;::: ;)
0 ; if i 2 C
 ( =  + 1;::: ;r)
: (4)
There is a border case which is particularly involved to treat and at which
the modiclus measures the in￿uence of both the short and the long side in a
most detailed fashion.
Theorem 3.1. Let v be an Ocean Game.





M > r ; (5)
then the modiclus is the ideal point, i.e.,















M < r ; (7)
























M = r ; (9)
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> > > > :
Mr + 1
 + rMr ; if i 2 C




M ; if i 2 C
 ( =  + 1;::: ;r)
: (11)
Proof: 1st STEP : We use the abbreviation b x :=  (v). In view of the
fact that agents of the same corner are ￿equals￿ the symmetry properties
(e.g., the equal treatment property, see Corollary 2.6 of [7]) of the modiclus
are relevant. They imply that there exist ￿convexifying￿ coe￿cients b c ( =
1;::: ;r) satisfying
b c  0 and
r X
=1
b c = 1 (12)
such that








holds true. Any two corners of the same cardinality can be exchanged without
changing the game (i.e., for C;C ( = 1;::: ;) with jCj = jCj there
is a permutation of the agent set I which maps C onto C such that the
￿permuted￿ game coincides with v). Hence, by anonymity (see Remark 1.2
of [8]) these corners are treated equally. That is, the coe￿cients b c ( =
1;::: ;r) of the corners satisfy
b c1 =  = b c and b c = b c (; =  + 1;::: ;r) if jC
j = jC
j: (14)
If  = r holds true, then v is an exact game. In an exact game any coalition
is e￿ective with respect to some core element. In this case equation (14)
already shows the theorem, because (5) is satis￿ed. In view of this fact we
assume that r >  from now on.
2nd STEP : Now we consider an arbitrary convex combination of the 
 ( =
1;::: ;r): Indeed, let c denote a vector of convexifying coe￿cients, i.e., c is
assumed to satisfy
c  0 ( = 1;::: ;r) and
r X
=1
c = 1; (15)? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 16
and de￿ne
x








Using this notation the modiclus can be expressed by b x = xb c: For any
coalition S 2 P, the excess is given by
e(S;x;v) = v(S)   x(S)












































and hence the excess increases with increasing S on the diagonal D. It follows
that the maximal excess is attained by the maximal diagonal coalitions, i.e.,

















1 ( =  + 1;::: ;r) (19)
is satis￿ed. By (17) the value of this maximal excess is given by







3rd STEP : Now we turn to the maximal dual excess at x = xc. In view of
(14) we shall assume from now on that c satis￿es (15) and
c1 =  = c and c = c (; =  + 1;::: ;r) if jC
j = jC
j: (21)? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 17
Let S 2 P be any coalition. Choose  2 f1;::: ;rg such that v(S) is attained
by 
(S): Then we obtain the inequalities
e(S;x;v) = 
(S)   x(S)  
(S)   x(S)   x(I   C)
  x(I   C) = e(I   C;x;v): (22)
Hence the minimal primal excess is attained for coalitions of the shape
S = C
1 [  [ ; [  [ C
r = I   C
;
whenever c = minfc j  = 1;::: ;rg holds true. Therefore the maximal
dual excess appears for coalitions of the shape
T = ; [  [ ; [ C
 [ ; [ ::: [ ; = C

and the value of this maximal dual excess is
(x;v

















and the maximal bi-excess
e (x;v) = (x;v) + (x;v
?)
is described by
























=1;:::;rc c satis￿es (15) and (21)
)
(26)
We are now going to show that a maximizer of (26) has to assign constant
weights to the nonminimal corners. Indeed, de￿ne a vector ~ c by
~ c1 =  = ~ c =
1   (r   )min=1;:::;r c

; ~ c+1 =  = ~ cr = min
=1;:::;rc? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 18


































=1;:::;rc   c = 0
holds true and the occurring inequality is strict unless c = ~ c holds true.
Therefore, a maximizer c of (26) has to satisfy c1    cr. By (21) this
vector c satis￿es




c = 1: (27)
Note that for any  2 R satisfying 0    1 there is a unique underlying
vector c satisfying c = : Indeed, the vector c is de￿ned by the requirement
c1 =  = c =
1   (r   )

; c+1 =  = cr = : (28)
For convenience we use the expression x and xc synonymously. Then, e.g.,
b x = xb  holds true and x = r x + (1   r)

x is valid for any  2 R in
general.
Hence the modiclus or rather the real number b  := b c has to constitute a
solution of the problem indicated by
max
(
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4th STEP : Inspection of the maximizing problem posed by (31) shows the
following:
Let   be a maximizer of (31). If (5) or (7) repectively is satis￿ed, then   = 1
r
or   = 0 respectively must be true. The arising convexifying coe￿cients
correspond to the case that b x =  x or b x =

x respectively happens to be true.
Hence the ￿rst two assertions of the theorem are proved.
5th STEP : It remains to consider the case that (9) is true. Then the max-
imal bi-excess is the same for all convex combinations of  x and

x, i.e., the
set of the maximizers given by (31) is in fact f 2 R j 0    1
rg: A careful
inspection of (17) shows that for any satisfying 0 <  < 1 the maximal
excess (x;v) is only attained by the coalitions in Dm, i.e.,




holds true. If, in addition,  < 1
r; then a careful inspection of (22) shows that
the maximal dual excess (x;v?) is only attained by the corners C ( =









?) = ( x;v
?) ( = 1;::: ;)
hold true, thus the set of pairs of coalitions that attain the maximal bi-excess
at x0 =

x as well as at x
1
r =  x strictly contains the set of pairs of coalitions
attaining the maximal bi-excess at x (0 <  < 1
r): As the modiclus xb  is
the imputation that lexicographically minimizes the vector of all bi-excesses,
it ￿rst minimizes the maximal bi-excess and secondly minimizes the number
of pairs attaining this maximal bi-excess. We conclude that 0 < b  < 1
r must
hold.
Therefore, we shall consider the second highest bi-excess now. Let 0 <  < 1
r
and x = x:
6th STEP : First we consider the second highest primal excess. In view
of (17) this excess can be attained either at the second largest diagonal
coalitions (containing M1   1 members of every corner) or at the coalition
immediately ￿on top of Dm￿ (containing M1 +1 members of some corner C






?) = e (x
;v) = (x;v) + M
1(1   );? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 20
thus (17) implies that the excess of the former coalitions coincides with
(x;v)  and the excess of the latter coalitions coincides with (x;v) M1
Mr.
Summarizing these facts the second highest excess 2() at x satis￿es the
expression
2() = maxfe(S;x





7th STEP : Now we turn to the second highest dual excess. Let T 2 P be
given. For any  = 1;::: ;r satisfying v(I   T) = 
(I   T) (i.e. v?(T) =
M1   




e((I   T) + fig;x;v); if i 2 T   C






e(T   fig;x;v?); if i 2 T   C
e(T + fjg;x;v?); if j 2 (I   T) \ C : (33)
Hence the second highest dual excess can either be attained by all coalitions
C ( = 1;::: ;) or by coalitions consisting of one complete carrier and
one additional agent. In the latter case the dual excess is maximal, if the
coalition can be written as C + fig such that i 2 C for some  satisfying
M = Mr (i.e., agent i is a member of some maximal corner C) and  2
f + 1;::: ;rg   fg. That is, the corner C is not of minimal size and it is
not C: In fact (9) implies r  +2; thus the coalitions Cr 1+fig (i 2 Cr)









In order to determine the dual excess in the former case let c be the under-





1(1   c1) = M





















By the equations (34) and (35) the second highest dual excess ?
2() at x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8th STEP : The second highest bi-excess e 2() at x satis￿es the expression






By (36) and (32) we obtain





















1   rb 

: (37)
The solution of (37) immediately yields (10) or (11). q.e.d.







which measures the relations of total initial assignments.
Obviously condition (5) is satis￿ed if the total assignments M ( = 1;::: ;r)
exceed the total assignment M1 only moderately. Therefore, the conditions
rendering the modiclus to be either the center of the core or the ideal point
are interpreted in a most natural way: The ideal point appears when the
long side of the market is not excessively large compared to the short side.
Otherwise the modiclus will fall into the core and yield its central point.
The intermediate situation represented by (9) is the border case in which the
relation between the two extreme cases is carefully balanced.





be an Ocean Game.
1. If   r   1 holds true, then formula (5) is automatically satis￿ed
and, thus, the modiclus coincides with the ideal point in this case. In
particular, this is true for r = 2.? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 22
2. The same is true, if the weights M only di￿er moderately, e.g., if
(r   1)M1 > (r   2)Mr holds true.
3. An example for the border case is obtained for r  3 by the requirement
 = r 2 and Mr = Mr 1 = 2M1: In this case the modiclus b x =  (v)
can be computed via (11) which yields
b xi =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
2M1 + 1
r   2 + 2rM1 ; if i 2 C
 ( = 1;::: ;r   2)
M1
r   2 + 2rM1 ; if i 2 C




b xj(v) approaches 2 for i 2
Sr 2
=1 C; j 2 Cr 1 [ Cr
whenever M1 approaches 1: This means that equal treatment of the
corners is ￿approximately￿ satis￿ed for a huge total minimal weight M1:
It is now seen how the bargaining power of the various cartels arises. The
vector c of convexifying coe￿cients represents the shares of the corners, this
is the result of the external bargaining process between the (representatives
of the) various cartels. How is the modiclus capable of assigning positive
coe￿cients to the long side of the market?
The third step provides the answer: The dual game v? represents the pre-
ventive power of coalitions and it is seen that the maximal dual excess is
attained at the corners C. Thus, the cartels consisting of the various cor-
ners muster the maximal preventive power. In particular formula (24) shows
that the shortest side of the market (the smallest cartel) commands the max-
imal preventive power.
Accordingly, formula (25) shows the appropriate mixture of achievement
power and preventive power which has to be minimized in order to achieve
distribution according to the modiclus. The resulting minimizing problem
(after reversing the sign a maximizing problem) is suggested by (28) and
(31).
This way it can be seen that the external (or, from the view point of the
agents inside a cartel exogeneous) bargaining procedure between the cartels
is re￿ected by the maximizing procedure that determines the coe￿cients
leading to the modiclus.
The internal (or endogeneous) discussion between the members of a cartel
is, within the present framework, a less complicated matter. The symmetry? Section 3: The Modiclus of the Ocean Game ? 23
properties of the modiclus ensure that the allotment to each member of a
cartel is the same in view of the uniform distribution of initial assignments.
In other words, as all members of a particular corner of the market look alike
there is little room for exercising an internal bargaining power.
These matters become much more di￿cult when the initial assignment pro-
vide big chunks of commodity to single agents (multiple gloves for one agent).
Then the endogeneous bargaining process is much more di￿cult to explain.
The mathematical intricacies increase rapidly and the economic relevance of
the endogeneous procedure has to be studied within the framework of an
additional solution concept. This problem constitutes the basis for further
research.? REFERENCES ? 24
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